Quasar rat

quasar rat

Quasar Rat. Kategorie: Adware und PUAs, Schutz verfügbar seit: 22 Jan 19 (GMT). Typ: Unspecified PUA, Zuletzt aktualisiert: 22 Jan 5. Jan. Quasar v - geschrieben in Forum Rats: Heute möchte ich euch mal eine Open-Source Rat vorstellen. Mich wundert es, dass es zu dieser. GJ-Team, warum ist Quasar auf Eurer Greylist? Und natürlich werden wir uns morgen Rat von unserem Anwalt einholen und ggf. rechtlich. The attackers invested significant effort in attempting lotto seiten hide the tool by changing the source code of the RAT and the RAT server, and by using an obfuscator and packer. If the connection fails in some cases the system could be considered real sydney casino war battle lines redrawn amid china crackdown not a virtualized environment used by researchers. Get the assembly object by decompressing the resource and loading it with Reflection: Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has discovered a new malware family written using the Microsoft. Add typeof int; Exts. It runs in an infinite loop, in each iteration it requests a command from the C2, and then it sleeps for a time period it receives in the C2 response defaulting to 1 second if no sleep-time sent. Using AutoFocus, we tvguide uk quickly able to find similar samples, by pivoting on the artifacts the malware created during a sandbox run, resulting in 7 other samples as shown in Figure 2. Unit 42 Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from Unit42 By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement. Quasar server does not verify that sofortüberweisung was ist das size, casino baden baden arrangement, extension, or header of the uploaded file is the same as requested. We observed these Quasar samples:. NET version reno casino shows 2019 also present in the native version. After the TCP handshake completes, the server starts another handshake with the client by sending packets in the following order Figure Magic Seven Deluxe™ Slot Machine Game to Play Free in Zeus Plays Online Casinos

The attackers invested significant effort in attempting to hide the tool by changing the source code of the RAT and the RAT server, and by using an obfuscator and packer.

Unit 42 researchers observed the Quasar RAT being prevented from executing on a Traps-protected client in September We observed these Quasar samples:.

Further research found other Quasar examples, an attack earlier in the month on the same target:. We found the same Quasar code in an additional attack on the same day, but upon a different target.

A second Quasar sample was also observed attacking this new victim:. We do not have detailed visibility into the specific host attacked, and have not been able to reproduce the second stage of the attack in our lab.

However, based upon the timeframe of subsequent telemetry we observe, we understand the attack chain as follows:. Further research identified dozens of Dowenks and Quasar samples related to these attackers.

All included decoy documents written in Arabic all related to Middle Eastern politics or Hebrew. Most of them use the same mutex structure, share the same fake icon and unique metadata details, file writes, registry operations, and fake common program metadata, as seen in DustySky samples.

The Downeks downloader and Quasar C2 infrastructures are each self-contained and independent of each other. However, we did find a single shared IP address demonstrably connecting the Downeks downloader and Quasar C2 infrastructure s.

Charting the samples and infrastructure clearly shows the separate Downeks campaigns, and infrastructure links Figure In Figure 2, top-right green has the Quasar infrastructure Figure 3 , with a link to the Downeks infrastructure.

Left yellow is DustySky infrastructure Figure 4 and the links to this Downeks campaign. As well as similarities in the code, decoys and targets, we also identified C2 infrastructure links between DustySky and this campaign.

The remainder is sub-campaigns of Downeks samples, their infrastructure, their links — and a favored ISP center Figure 5.

We saw five samples built on the same date in December , and six on the same date in January, further solidifying the link between each sample.

We analyzed a Quasar sample we found that was communicating with an active C2 server at the time of analysis:. This sample is a modified version of Quasar, most likely forked from open source version 1.

The client was likely built using the Quasar server client builder. We observed the following customizations:. The malware uses fake version information to appear as a Microsoft update program, as well as Google Desktop once unpacked.

NET Framework packer which stores the original executable compressed zlib as a resource. At runtime, the packer decompresses the resource and uses Reflection to load the assembly, find its Entry point, and Invoke it.

Extracting the payload is straight forward — we simply dump the resource and decompress it. After decompilation, the packer looks like this:.

Find the resource and call InvokeApp: Get the assembly object by decompressing the resource and loading it with Reflection: And finally, find the entry point and invoke it: We discovered that the sample was obfuscated using.

It is possible to decompile the deobfuscated sample and retrieve most of the original source code but not enough to compile it easily. After decompiling the sample, we were able to document the modifications from the open-source Quasar.

The configuration of Quasar is stored in the Settings object, which is encrypted with a password which is itself stored unencrypted.

The key is the SHA hash of the hard-coded password. The password of the sample we analyzed is:. Although at first glance this appears somewhat complex, it is in fact a rather simple, repeated keyboard sequence.

We observe similar keyboard patterns in other samples: Quasar contains the NetSerializer library that handles serialization of high level IPacket objects that the client and server use to communicate.

The serialization assigns unique IDs for serializable objects types. The open source and several other samples we found give a dynamically-assigned 1 byte ID at compile time.

This is a better implementation, as it allows servers and clients from different versions to communicate with each other to some extent.

The sample we analyzed is most likely forked from open source quasar 1. Other samples we analyzed had different combinations of modification to cryptography and serialization.

Our decompilation of the serialization library was not complete enough to allow simple recompilation. Instead, we downloaded and compiled the 1.

The out-of-the-box server could not communicate with the client sample owing to the previously documented modifications that we had observed.

We incorporated those changes into our build, discovering that this worked for most sample versions with almost no further modification.

Both the client and the server use the same code to serialize and encrypt the communications. Instead of compiling a different server for each client, our server uses the code from within the client to communicate with it.

Using Reflection, the server can load the assembly of the client to find the relevant functions and passwords. This was more complex.

In some cases these objects are completely different, for example the server commands to get the file system. Our sample communicates with app.

Each of these layers seems to be different to some extent in the various samples we found. The IPacket, Serialization and Encryption framework code is shared between the client and the server, therefore we can use it with Reflection.

However the Server handlers and command function are not, so we cannot create a completely perfect simulation. After the TCP handshake completes, the server starts another handshake with the client by sending packets in the following order Figure The client returns data to the server about the victim computer, which is displayed in the server GUI Figure The server and client then enter into a keep-alive mode, where the attacker can send commands to the client and receive further responses.

The attacker can issue commands not all commands appear in different samples through the Quasar server GUI for each client:. With further analysis of the Quasar RAT C2 Server, we uncovered vulnerabilities in the server code, which would allow remote code execution.

We did not apply this to any live C2 servers — we only tested this with our own servers in our lab. Quasar server includes a File Manager window, allowing the attacker to select victim files, and trigger file operations — for example, uploading a file from victim machine to server.

Quasar server does not verify that the size, filename, extension, or header of the uploaded file is the same as requested.

When the Quasar server retrieves the name of the uploaded file from the victim, it does not verify that it is a valid file path. Quasar server does not even verify that a file was requested from the victim.

We can respond to those commands by instead sending two files of our choice to the Quasar server. Again, we control the content of the file, the size and the path and filename.

Although Downeks has been publicly examined to some extent, our analysis found several features not previously described.

Earlier Downeks samples were all written in native code. However, among our Downeks samples, we found new versions apparently written in.

These were not all on my system so it seems to be static list. NET framework open-source remote access trojan family used in cyber-criminal and cyber-espionage campaigns to target Windows operating system devices.

It is often delivered via malicious attachments in phishing and spear-phishing emails. Below you can see the connection that was established.

Below you can view my run starting at the AZORult binary. You are commenting using your WordPress. You are commenting using your Twitter account. You are commenting using your Facebook account.

Notify me of new comments via email. Recent article about AZORult — https: SHA 5fbb71a7dc77fdefc2bf93e0c77f04e2dc4cdf3 File name quas.

The chain begins with a dubious adult website which is loaded from another adult website. HookAds is a campaign that has been used to spread RigEK.

Got something to say? Quasar RAT is an open-source malware family which has been used in several other attack campaigns including criminal and espionage motivated attacks. The password of the sample we analyzed is:. The chain begins with a dubious adult website which is loaded from another adult website. The chain Beste Spielothek in Klein Kraußnigk finden on an adult page. This is a pseudo-unique ID for each machine, based on install date taken from the fenerbahce uefa, volume serial number, OS version and service pack, Processor architecture, and computer name. UnZip data ; memoryStream. Unit 42 researchers observed the Quasar RAT being prevented from executing on a Traps-protected client in September Note that these copy trading deutsch the actual variable names used by the malware author:. All 3 samples were james bond - casino royale with the same timestamp. Reno casino shows 2019 can also be instructed to execute binaries that already exist on the victim machine. Figure 2- Infrastructure Patterns and Connections In Figure 2, top-right green has the Quasar infrastructure Figure 3with a link to the Downeks infrastructure. Durch die Beste Spielothek in Moutier finden Nutzung unserer Webseite stimmst du der Verwendung von Cookies zu. In den Screens und im Log hab ich mein Verzeichnisstruktur gelöscht, aus Gründen. Ändere den Installationsort im Builder auf persönlicher Ordner vom Vic, das ist dann irgendwo im Betway casino win, da brauchst du keine Adminrechte. Wie läuft bei euch der November? Für mich ist das nowitzki punkte beste Rat nach LuminosityLink! Oktober - Vorgestern Vorstellung von Spieldev:

Each file is saved with the following format: The data is encrypted using the same method and 3-DES key, used to encrypt the configuration file.

Often remote access tools written in. NET borrow and steal code from other tools due to the plethora of code available through open source; however, it appears that whilst some small segments of code may have been lifted from other tools, this RAT is not a fork of a well-known malware family: We have linked all the samples we have been able to identify to the same cluster of activity: We were unable to definitively determine the aims of the attackers or the data stolen.

Ukraine remains a ripe target for attacks, even gaining its own dedicated Wikipedia page for attacks observed in Palo Alto Networks defends our customers against the samples discussed in this blog in the following ways:.

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It all began with a tweet Our initial interest was piqued through a tweet from a fellow researcher who had identified some malware with an interesting theme relating to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense as a lure.

We quickly built up a picture of a campaign spanning just over 2 years with a modest C2 infrastructure: Names of some of the other dropper binaries observed are given below, with the original Ukrainian on the left and the translated English via Google on the right: SHA addaea03bbd4bdf52ec01cce63c0fdbc07 Compile Timestamp Following initial execution, the malware first checks if the installed input language in the system is equal to any of the following: After passing the installed language check the malware proceeds to decrypt an embedded resource using the following logic: It retrieves the final four bytes of the encrypted resource.

These four bytes are a CRC32 sum, and the malware then proceeds to brute force what 6-byte values will give this CRC32 sum.

Once it finds this array of 6 bytes it performs an MD5 hash sum on the bytes, this value is used as the key. However, we did find a single shared IP address demonstrably connecting the Downeks downloader and Quasar C2 infrastructure s.

Charting the samples and infrastructure clearly shows the separate Downeks campaigns, and infrastructure links Figure In Figure 2, top-right green has the Quasar infrastructure Figure 3 , with a link to the Downeks infrastructure.

Left yellow is DustySky infrastructure Figure 4 and the links to this Downeks campaign. As well as similarities in the code, decoys and targets, we also identified C2 infrastructure links between DustySky and this campaign.

The remainder is sub-campaigns of Downeks samples, their infrastructure, their links — and a favored ISP center Figure 5. We saw five samples built on the same date in December , and six on the same date in January, further solidifying the link between each sample.

We analyzed a Quasar sample we found that was communicating with an active C2 server at the time of analysis:. This sample is a modified version of Quasar, most likely forked from open source version 1.

The client was likely built using the Quasar server client builder. We observed the following customizations:. The malware uses fake version information to appear as a Microsoft update program, as well as Google Desktop once unpacked.

NET Framework packer which stores the original executable compressed zlib as a resource. At runtime, the packer decompresses the resource and uses Reflection to load the assembly, find its Entry point, and Invoke it.

Extracting the payload is straight forward — we simply dump the resource and decompress it. After decompilation, the packer looks like this:.

Find the resource and call InvokeApp: Get the assembly object by decompressing the resource and loading it with Reflection: And finally, find the entry point and invoke it: We discovered that the sample was obfuscated using.

It is possible to decompile the deobfuscated sample and retrieve most of the original source code but not enough to compile it easily. After decompiling the sample, we were able to document the modifications from the open-source Quasar.

The configuration of Quasar is stored in the Settings object, which is encrypted with a password which is itself stored unencrypted.

The key is the SHA hash of the hard-coded password. The password of the sample we analyzed is:. Although at first glance this appears somewhat complex, it is in fact a rather simple, repeated keyboard sequence.

We observe similar keyboard patterns in other samples: Quasar contains the NetSerializer library that handles serialization of high level IPacket objects that the client and server use to communicate.

The serialization assigns unique IDs for serializable objects types. The open source and several other samples we found give a dynamically-assigned 1 byte ID at compile time.

This is a better implementation, as it allows servers and clients from different versions to communicate with each other to some extent. The sample we analyzed is most likely forked from open source quasar 1.

Other samples we analyzed had different combinations of modification to cryptography and serialization. Our decompilation of the serialization library was not complete enough to allow simple recompilation.

Instead, we downloaded and compiled the 1. The out-of-the-box server could not communicate with the client sample owing to the previously documented modifications that we had observed.

We incorporated those changes into our build, discovering that this worked for most sample versions with almost no further modification. Both the client and the server use the same code to serialize and encrypt the communications.

Instead of compiling a different server for each client, our server uses the code from within the client to communicate with it.

Using Reflection, the server can load the assembly of the client to find the relevant functions and passwords. This was more complex.

In some cases these objects are completely different, for example the server commands to get the file system. Our sample communicates with app.

Each of these layers seems to be different to some extent in the various samples we found. The IPacket, Serialization and Encryption framework code is shared between the client and the server, therefore we can use it with Reflection.

However the Server handlers and command function are not, so we cannot create a completely perfect simulation.

After the TCP handshake completes, the server starts another handshake with the client by sending packets in the following order Figure The client returns data to the server about the victim computer, which is displayed in the server GUI Figure From the looks of it, it may be trying to patch itself.

At the bottom of this long POST request filled with all of my systems data is a base64 encoded part which decodes listing registry key names, software, etc.

These were not all on my system so it seems to be static list. NET framework open-source remote access trojan family used in cyber-criminal and cyber-espionage campaigns to target Windows operating system devices.

It is often delivered via malicious attachments in phishing and spear-phishing emails. Below you can see the connection that was established.

Below you can view my run starting at the AZORult binary. You are commenting using your WordPress. You are commenting using your Twitter account.

R0b3rt Noob Members Likes. Das war's mit den Casinos und den streamern. Bin an das Skype-Account über den Keylogger von Quasar gelangt. Geschrieben 28 Februar - Du musst angemeldet oder registriert sein, um eine Antwort erstellen zu können. Frage zu DrückGlück auszahlung. Nach oben Melden Thanked by 1 Member: Idiot85 , gestern um Alle drei Möglichkeiten gibt es und habe ich bei meinen Vics. Die saubere und beschädigte Version dieses Programms kann auf der Grundlage dessen, wie es gepackt wird, die Art der Netzwerkkommunikation und das Vorhandensein der Verschleierungsschicht unterscheiden. Angemeldet bleiben Nicht empfehlenswert für öffentliche Computer.

rat quasar -

PSC Verlosung - "Rätsel". Geschrieben 22 Februar - Casinos, welche Geburtstagsboni vergeben. Verwaltung unserer zentralen Synchronized-Security-Plattform in einer Anwendung. Cube44 , gestern um Willkommen Gast Anmelden Benutzerkonto erstellen. Geschrieben 28 Februar - Die besten Hacking Tools zum downloaden: Also ich editiere den Post mal ganz neu jetzt. Besucher die dieses Thema lesen: Nevadagestern um Ich hab mir nur kurz die Codes im git angeschaut und dann meine VMs startklar gemacht. Bitte Beste Spielothek in Vorwerk Kützkow finden Sie den Hinweisen zum Entfernen formel 1 2019 monza Anwendungen. Beste Spielothek in Kirchheim an der Eck finden Sophos Home Free business-grade security for the home. Randomheute um Frage zu DrückGlück auszahlung. Thanked by 54 Members:. Born2Hack, TFoX, devmonkey und 7 anderen gefällt das. Solltest du vorübergehend Probleme haben dich mit deiner E-Mail anzumelden, versuche es bitte mit deinem Benutzernamen. Passwörter und Keyloggs kann man schön übersichtlich sortiert als.

Quasar rat -

Beginne mit der Suche in Ende des Suchlaufs: Nur registrierte Mitglieder haben Zugriff hierauf. Geschrieben 12 Februar - Nach einem reboot ging alles wies soll und die ehemals genannten Probleme waren damit gelöst. Alle drei Möglichkeiten gibt es und habe ich bei meinen Vics.

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